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Marginalization, Young People in the South and East Mediterranean, and 
Policy. An Analysis of Young People’s Experiences of Marginalization 
across Six SEM Countries, and Guidelines for Policy-makers
Mark D. Calder, Robert MacDonald, Drew Mikhael, Emma C. Murphy and Jo Phoenix1
Abstract
This document is the report for Work Package 7 (WP7) of the EU-funded project Power2Youth 
(P2Y). WP7 provides an overview of the key policy messages for the EU that arise from the 
research conducted as part of Work Packages 1–6. These key messages are: (1) young people 
face multiple forms of marginalization, with the exact nature and combination depending 
on their social circumstances (including but not exclusively nationality, place of residence, 
socio-economic class, religion, sect, gender and clan); (2) the problems faced by young 
people in the South and East Mediterranean (SEM) countries are reminiscent of those faced 
by young people in the EU; however, they are often faced in more extreme form (e.g., rates 
of graduate unemployment) and some are quite different (e.g., the extreme levels of political 
and personal insecurity endured by SEM young people); (3) although young people are 
particularly vulnerable to processes of marginalization, these processes are not exclusive 
to them and are indicative of deeper structural problems (political and economic) affecting 
populations as a whole; (4) the processes that do most to marginalize young people (and 
people more generally) are not currently addressed by national policies; in fact, national 
policies can exacerbate young people’s problems; and (5) policy-making, or interventions 
in support of national policy-making, by external actors can also exacerbate the problems 
when they inadvertently endorse government policies that perpetuate deep structural 
problems such as authoritarianism, corruption or over-reliance on a weak private sector to 
create demand for labour. This report also offers a set of guiding principles for EU policy-
makers based on conclusions drawn from across the Power2Youth projects. To be aligned 
with these principles, all policies should: (1) ensure that they “do no harm”; (2) recognize that, 
predominantly, young people’s problems are not “problems with young people” but reflect 
deep-seated structural weaknesses of SEM states; and (3) be helpful to young people – which 
means tackling these problems.
Keywords: Youth | South Mediterranean | East Mediterranean | Education | Employment
INTRODUCTION
In the period 2010–13 a wave of youth-led protests swept across North Africa and the Eastern 
Mediterranean. In some cases the protests had remarkable results, leading to the ousting of 
long-time authoritarian leaders Zine el Abidine Ben Ali in Tunisia, Hosni Mubarak in Egypt 
1 Mark D. Calder is Postdoctoral Research Associate at Durham University. Robert MacDonald is Professor of 
Sociology at the School of Social Sciences, Business & Law of the Teesside University. Drew Mikhael is Lecturer 
at Queen’s University Belfast and Postdoctoral Research Associate at Durham University. Emma C. Murphy is 
Professor in Middle East Political Economy at School of Government & International Affairs of Durham University. 
Jo Phoenix holds the Chair in Criminology at the Department of Criminology and Social Policy, Open University.
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and Muammar Ghaddafi in Libya. Since that time young people have remained of key interest 
to policy-makers, both inside these countries and in the international community; they 
have proved themselves to be active and dynamic agents in a region which is experiencing 
profound political, economic and social upheaval. Yet, in European popular (and political) 
culture, young people from North Africa and the Eastern Mediterranean countries are more 
commonly associated with the alleged “tide” of informal migrants seeking political freedom 
and economic security in Europe, or with the efforts of violent Islamist extremist groups. 
Indeed, these representations have come to form a central plank in the various resurgent, 
right-wing populist political parties seeking electoral power – see for instance the National 
Front in France and United Kingdom Independence Party in the UK. What is less visible in 
European public and political representations is the ongoing efforts of young people in SEM 
countries to contribute to political reforms, to generate a lively and robust civil society, to 
volunteer and to be social entrepreneurs in their own countries – and importantly, their 
day-to-day struggles with social, economic and political marginalization. Given the relative 
size of the youth population in SEM countries and the scale of the challenges facing those 
countries it is clear, as is evidenced through protests and activism, that public policy, whether 
on the part of regional governments or their international interlocutors, is currently failing to 
adequately address youth needs. Revising public policy requires first and foremost a better 
understanding of the status, conditions, needs and perspectives of young people themselves.
Power2Youth is an EU-funded project which offers an interdisciplinary, gender-sensitive 
analysis of the economic, political and socio-cultural conditions of young people. It explores 
the root causes and complex dynamics of youth exclusion and inclusion in the labour market 
and civil/political life, and investigates the potentially transformative effect of youth agency. 
Power2Youth examines the structural determinants on the lives of young people, and how 
youth might become active agents in society and in their own well-being. The gender-
sensitive approach has allowed the project to capture differences in the ways in which 
young men and young women experience political, economic and social life, and how they 
might approach adulthood. The project analysed the status, conditions and perspectives of 
young people at three levels: the macro (or national state and institutional) level, the meso 
(organizational) level and the micro (individual) level; and developed progressive and youth-
informed guidelines for national and supranational policy-makers.2
This report provides a summary of the major findings of Power2Youth that are pertinent to 
policy development. It is important to highlight that the descriptions of young people’s lives 
contained within this report are derived from an analysis of the reports and data produced 
across Work Packages 1–6. The validity of these descriptions (along with the policy guidelines 
that are the subject of this report) were triangulated with young people in a series of in-
depth, qualitative focus groups conducted in three of the case study countries.
2 The project ran from March 2014 to May 2017, and received 2.5 million Euro under the Framework 7 scheme. 
It comprised 9 work packages, each responsible for different aspects of the project, and engaged 13 partner 
institutions from Europe and the SEM region, including 6 case study countries (Morocco, Tunisia, Egypt, Lebanon, 
Occupied Palestinian Territories and Turkey) where original qualitative and quantitative data was collected from a 
range of sources (including: public statistics, public documents and academic studies; focus groups and interviews 
with relevant stakeholders and key informants (including young people and youth-based CSOs); and large-scale 
nation-wide surveys (including a total of 7,573 young people between the ages of 15 and 29).
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This report recommends guidelines for developing progressive and youth-informed national 
and supranational policy for dealing with young people’s marginalization in the SEM countries 
examined. Before doing so this report addresses the key definitional challenge of the research 
(what is “youth”?) and then describes the approach taken to by the Power2Youth consortia. 
The report also describes the demographic challenges facing SEM countries and, drawing 
on the country-specific analyses, provides an overview of how the issue of “youth” has 
been addressed in national policies so far. The next section of the report offers a definition 
of “social exclusion” before describing what have been identified as the six most common 
forms of marginalization experienced by young people with regard to policy. Given that 
marginalization is shaped by and within socially, historically, ideologically, economically 
and politically specific contexts, and by and within the specificities of each country, this 
report does not provide a set of policy recommendations to cover all SEM countries. Nor 
is the analysis of the drivers of marginalization exhaustive. In approaching the voluminous 
data produced by Power2Youth and in listening to the various presentations, seminars and 
discussions with partner organizations and colleagues, we have tried to distil both 1) the 
common experiences that SEM young people report, and 2) those common experiences that 
are (or ought to be) of central concern to those involved in policy-making. The final section 
of this report concludes by outlining a set of guidelines for developing youth-informed or 
“youth-wise” policies, that is to say, policies that address the social conditions that give rise 
to young people’s marginalization, and that do not further exacerbate their problems.
1. WHO ARE “YOUTH”?
An issue faced by most researchers when studying youth is to decide who to include, and 
why. The category of “youth” is socially constructed. It depends on a range of social, cultural 
and political factors which together determine when a society considers someone to be 
somewhere between the status of a child and a full adult. For policy-makers, who need to be 
able to identify a clearly demarcated target group for policies, youth has usually been an age-
based category, the upper and lower boundaries of which depend on narratives formulated 
by policy-makers themselves (Coles 1995). In Europe youth is often defined as being between 
the ages of 15 and 29, a period when young people are making what is known as the “school-
to-work” transition. Not surprisingly then, youth policy tends to revolve around issues of 
education and employment, or lack thereof.
For young people in SEM countries defining youth by their biological age is especially 
problematic as research has clearly shown that a range of political, economic and social 
factors lead to delayed transitions to adulthood, defined as the achievement of material 
independence and personal autonomy (Dhillion and Yousef 2009). In other words, biological 
age has little to do with when or how adulthood is achieved. To make matters more 
complicated the research demonstrated that both between and within national contexts, the 
biological age-based boundaries used by policy-makers varied enormously depending on the 
political and social considerations behind specific policy agendas. Thus a young Moroccan 
female could be deemed to have achieved a principal marker of adulthood – the legal age at 
which she might marry – at just nine years of age, but she cannot vote in national elections 
until she is 18. She can, however, access youth-specific micro-finance loans from local World 
Bank schemes until she is 29 and youth-targeted government-sourced loans until she is 45 
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(Catusse and Destremau 2016: 8). The contours of the “youth” category vary enormously and 
are subject constantly to political and institutional manipulations which have less to do with 
the real lives of young people and more to do with how regimes and powerful social groups 
construct a social order.
Power2Youth took a flexible approach overall to data collection, and allowed the voices of 
young people who considered themselves to fall within the category of “youth” to define the 
boundaries of the category where possible. However, for the purposes of determining sample 
selection in focus groups young people were nonetheless defined as being between 18 and 
30 years of age and for the large-scale survey between the ages of 18 and 29. This enabled 
Power2Youth to generate very detailed new data from young people across six countries. The 
young people differed by nationality, social class, ethnicity, gender, religion and other factors. 
In this report we focus on some of these differences, and particularly gender, but necessarily 
we are presenting overall, aggregated findings to give a picture of the shared conditions and 
experiences of marginalization of SEM young people.
Figure 1 | Respondents surveyed by Power2Youth by country and gender
2. DEMOGRAPHIC CHALLENGES IN SOUTH AND EAST MEDITERRANEAN 
COUNTRIES
The existence of a significant “youth bulge” was well known before the events of the Arab 
Spring and can clearly be seen in the demographic pyramid data presented for the six 
case study countries (see Figure 2). The bulge derives from the combination of declining 
infant mortality rates despite largely sustained female fertility rates (births per woman) 
which marked the second half of the twentieth century. Rapid economic development and 
modernization brought advances in health care, while extensive welfarist regimes negated 
the costs of maintaining high birth rates. Indeed, nationalist state ideologists resulted in pro-
natalist public policies which had high levels of cultural and religious resonance. By 1980 
the SEM region’s population growth rate had peaked at 3 percent per annum, but as oil 
rents receded and national economies stagnated, governments woke up to the expanding 
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costs of social provision for rapid population growth (which included not just health care but 
education, housing, public utility provision, urban development, transport and food subsidies, 
among others). Low-key, culturally sensitive family planning programmes were introduced 
in some countries (Tunisia being among the forerunners here) but although fertility rates 
subsequently declined, the SEM average (at 2 percent per annum) was still significantly above 
a global average of just 1.2 percent (Assaad and Roudi-Fahimi 2009: 1) (see Figure 3).
A youth bulge brings with it specific political and economic challenges for governments (Murphy 
2012) as well as potential opportunities. South Korea, for example, was able to capitalize on a 
demographic bulge as a “gift” which created a large work force at a specific moment in time 
when the country was embarking on low-cost, labour-fuelled export-oriented growth. In the 
SEM countries, however, the context is different. The youth bulge takes places against high 
university enrolment rates and decades of welfarist provision which have raised wages and 
employment expectations while the economies lack the vibrant private sector which might 
mobilize the expanding potential labour force for growth. The resulting high unemployment 
rates, coupled with cultural preferences which have suppressed female participation in the 
labour force, mean the SEM region now has one of the highest dependency ratios in the 
world. This is at a time when governments, in line with neo-liberal economic formulations, are 
withdrawing the welfare provision of past decades. The region is experiencing rising poverty 
rates, growing inequality and the rupture of social contracts which had provided the thin veil 
of legitimacy for increasingly autocratic regimes.
SEM young people are exceptionally vulnerable to the evolution of the social and political 
processes outlined above because they lack political, economic or social power which might 
enable them to defend their interests. This has led to a characterization of young people as 
having been held back from achieving the social, economic and political markers of adulthood, 
being trapped in “stalled transition” and becoming a so called “generation in waiting” – both 
across the SEM and in Europe. The failure to “progress” is seen primarily in relation to a 
“moment of transfer between activity categories” (education to employment, family of birth 
to family of choice) (Fergusson 2016: 37). What is often overlooked though is the way in 
which such “failure to progress” is shaped by broader political and policy decisions (see also 
MacDonald et al. 2001, Raffe 2003).
Young people are too often unable to earn the income needed to progress to the next stage 
of material independence which would allow them to leave the family home, marry, and 
become parents. They struggle to develop the range of educational and soft skills needed 
to find employment in an increasingly competitive labour market that itself provides too 
few opportunities for good quality employment. Forced to remain dependent on the family, 
they also remain subordinated to kinship structures and social institutions which privilege 
elders and males and which constrain the personal autonomy of younger people, females 
in particular. Alongside state authoritarianism, this comprises a disabling environment in 
which individuals’ ability to pursue alternatives to given social, economic and political roles 
is greatly limited – all of which has led to assertions within policy circles at both national and 
international levels that SEM young people are increasingly socially excluded.
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Figure 2 | Demographic pyramid data across six case study countries
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Figure 2 | Demographic pyramid data across six case study countries (continued)
Source: UNDESA 2015.
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Figure 3 | Annual population growth rates (percentage)
Source: World Bank Open Data, http://data.worldbank.org.
3. HOW DO EXISTING PUBLIC POLICIES IN SEM COUNTRIES ADDRESS 
YOUNG PEOPLE?
As well as examining the lives of young people, Power2Youth interrogated existing public 
action, specifically the policies of the state and institutional structures in individual SEM 
countries in relation to the ways in which they addressed “youth” as a category and/or dealt 
with issues arising from the youth bulge. This part of the project aimed to understand how 
public policies impact upon youth, and whether these are youth-specific or the by-product of 
policies in other domains. As well as examining national youth policy, the project therefore 
also examined four other inter-related public action domains: employment, family, migration 
and spatial planning.
In what follows, we describe the dominant policy context within which young people across 
the SEM experienced their lives. State policies, and those of the state’s institutions, are never 
neutral but are rather the outcomes of mobilization by a plurality of actors with influence 
over the state. In the SEM countries, key considerations include the “weakness” of the state, 
by which we refer to the high insulation from, and low responsiveness to, the wider society. As 
a result, weak states frequently have low levels of popular legitimacy, are reliant on coercive 
apparatuses and exhibit inefficient administrations. SEM states are also engaged to greater 
or lesser degrees in compliance with neo-liberal economic approaches which encourage a 
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retreat of the state from social protection and publicly funded welfare promotion. This acts 
as an overarching framework for public policy which impacts on youth across policy domains.
Power2Youth’s examination of national youth policy in six SEM countries, and of policies in the 
four associated policy domains, revealed that policy is constructed around narratives of youth 
which have less to do with youth interests and needs and more to do with government and 
institutional needs to control or contain young people. Similar processes occur in European 
countries (albeit that the dominant narratives of youth are different; see Griffin 1993).
Youth are typically portrayed in one of two ways, or often in both ways simultaneously: either 
as the “hope of the nation” or as a problem, even a “threat to the nation”. Studies of national 
youth and youth-relevant policies and strategies show that archetypes of young people are 
created and promoted by the state institutions and within social groups. “Good youth” are 
those whose social, economic and political activity conforms to practices actively promoted 
by governments (which are largely authoritarian, patriarchal and neo-liberal). Included in the 
“good” practices of young people are membership in regime political parties and conformity 
to conservative social behavioural norms which reproduce political passivity. “Bad” youth are 
those who do not conform, and who actively challenge or abstain from mainstream political 
participation. Framed in this way, political activism which rejects state discourses, or behaviour 
which challenges traditional social norms, is equated with delinquency, social deviancy or 
even potential drug abuse or violence.3 This way of designating young people occurs in both 
authoritarian and non-authoritarian SEM states and results in rejecting or even criminalizing 
the efforts of young people to define their own needs, interests and perspectives. On the 
extreme end of the scale, authoritarian regimes employ violent means (including assault, 
arbitrary arrest, detention and human rights abuses) to contain young people’s dissent and 
free expression. State control, violent or otherwise, is authorized by conservative social 
values, a situation which leaves young people powerless and disenfranchised as they are 
unable to address the other problems they face in their everyday lives. International partners 
are collaborators in the projection of these narratives, as they work with and through national 
governments and all too often uncritically accept these categorizations of young people. 
As international policy-makers are increasingly concerned with the two “threats” of Islamic 
violent extremism and informal migration, both of which draw heavily on youth cohorts, the 
narratives of “good” and “bad” youth have become heavily securitized, drawing SEM regimes 
and external actors into common alliances which reinforce (or at least fail to challenge) 
these narratives of control and governance. Too often, the policy-focused interventions of 
international partners may actively reproduce these narratives and damage the ability of 
young people to change their world.
For example, prior to the turn of the millennium, all SEM governments supported national 
ministries and institutions which targeted youth specifically but which were largely confined to 
supporting sporting, leisure, popular educational and cultural activities which were politically 
co-opted by ruling regimes and which privileged young men as their key constituency. 
The range of public agencies explicitly adopting youth as their target group multiplied 
around the turn of the century as the impact of the youth bulge on education budgets and 
3 For detailed information on the various ways in which this happens, please see Power2Youth publications, 
http://www.power2youth.eu/publications.
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unemployment figures began to be felt. In short, the agenda become an economic one rather 
than just a matter of political incorporation and subordination. With the youth-led protests of 
2011, the institutionalization of a “youth problem” became visible, not least as international 
organizations and partners became interested in supporting the youth policy initiatives of 
national governments. However, the Power2Youth research showed that many of the new or 
apparently re-invigorated public institutions in the six countries are little more than shells, 
lacking proper data and information about youth, remaining heavily politicized and lacking 
serious resources to address priority areas.
At the same time, many other public institutions with agendas such as education, health, 
housing, employment, urban or rural development, transportation and citizenship rights 
pursue agendas which impact heavily and often very negatively on young people. Public policy, 
beyond that concerned explicitly with youth, orders space and society, and young people’s 
place in both; therefore, we cannot understand the relevance of impact of youth policy in 
the SEM countries without locating it relative to other arenas of public policy: employment; 
migration; family and personal status; and spatial planning and management.
3.1 Employment Policies: An Overemphasis on the Supply-side
Across the SEM countries and in common with many EU countries, public employment 
policy has been dramatically transformed over the life-course of the current youth cohort. 
Whilst their parents enjoyed the benefits of expanding public sectors, offering white collar 
employment opportunities with substantial accompanying employment-related benefits, 
policy today assumes the private sector to be the necessary engine of the economy and has 
led to the retrenchment of social insurance and workers’ rights accordingly. Employment 
policy is no longer about public provision of employment but about equipping potential 
employees with the skills, capacities and attributes said to be required by the private sector: 
it focuses on developing the supply of labour rather than ensuring adequate demand for 
labour. However, SEM economies remain weak and local private sectors have too often 
proved themselves uncompetitive, unable to attract the necessary investment, and unable 
to offer either the quantity or quality of job opportunities needed to absorb new entrants 
into the labour market. A similar argument has been made about the failure of youth policies 
to tackle the structural, underlying causes of youth unemployment and underemployment 
in the EU (e.g., MacDonald 2011). In this context, when “employability programmes strive to 
enhance self-employment or auto-entrepreneurship rather than acting upon labour markets 
structures” (Catusse and Destremau 2016: 16), employment policy tends to simply enhance 
competition for jobs in an overcrowded market. As older workers defer retirement and hang 
on to expensive employment-related privileges already won, young people who lack social 
and political capital are more vulnerable to unemployment or underemployment. Youth-
specific policies which focus on capacity building and entrepreneurship, and which benefit 
the most educated (and often males), can pacify the potential for dissent from the most 
capable constituency and can work well for some individuals, but they cannot resolve the 
long-term structural inability of national economies to provide sufficient job opportunities 
for the whole youth cohort.
Moreover, strategies and policies which place the onus on young people to be adaptive and 
resilient are at risk of exacerbating problems by ignoring the structural realities. For example, 
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young people may be encouraged to develop entrepreneurial skills, borrow capital and start 
their own small businesses. But in environments where those businesses cannot succeed 
(due to corruption, over-regulation, poor risk assessment by lenders, absence of follow-up 
support, lack of access to markets, etc.), the young person can find him or herself badly in 
debt and without assistance during the experience of business failure. Although much of this 
is familiar across the SEM and the EU (e.g., see MacDonald and Coffield 1991), as will be seen 
below, it has a particularly negative effect on SEM young people when combined with other 
forms of marginalization.
3.2 Migration Policies: Conflicting Needs and Old Economies
Migration policies manage often conflicting needs. On the one hand, SEM governments 
are mindful of the economic benefits generated by the money sent home by emigrants, as 
well as the political gains to be had from exporting unemployment and the dissent which 
accompanies it. On the other hand, recipient countries of SEM migrants have legitimate 
security and border-control needs of their own which must be accommodated by SEM public 
policy. Power2Youth found that resulting migration policies compounded existing inequalities 
among SEM youth – the limited opportunities for formal or legal migration were ones that 
privileged educated migrants (who already had access to language skills and contacts or 
educational opportunities abroad), as well as some nationalities or confessions. Less educated 
young people and those from working-class or economically marginalized communities were 
more likely to be propelled into informal or illegal migration (with all the accompanying risks). 
Male youth were also more likely to feel confident to undertake migration, although young 
women are increasingly likely to consider it.
3.3 Family and Personal Status Policies: Entrenching Gender Inequality
Since the turn of the millennium, case study countries have borne witness to an increasingly 
socially conservative approach to family and personal status policies. These have been 
described as
strengthen[ing] the heterosexual family norm, based on radical gender differences 
[…] Sometimes accompanied by a natalist policy to defend nationalist interests, 
attacks have multiplied on females’ reproductive rights, while age at marriage and 
ensuing earlier start in fertility tend to decrease. These tendencies are “fraught with 
paradoxes” (Catusse and Destremau 2016: 19).
State policies have enabled ever-greater legal restrictions on women (such as their right to 
pass on their nationality in Lebanon), or have endorsed patriarchal social norms, for example 
by the provision of financial support to women to stay at home and take care of children in 
Turkey. Family law is heavily influenced by religious law (if not entirely subordinate to it as 
in Lebanon) and sexual behaviour is generally subject to legal as well as social constraints 
which treat any alternative to the heterosexual “norm” as deviant, dangerous and criminal. 
Restrictions and uncertainties abound as economic insecurity and government policies propel 
women into education and the labour force while at the same time drawing them more tightly 
under the normative and institutional control of patriarchal structures. In practice this often 
means that women’s experiences of marginalization across SEM countries are qualitatively 
different to those of men, particularly in relation to issues of insecurity and safety, as will be 
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described below.
3.4 Spatial Planning and Management Policies: Fear and Immobility
Despite governments’ showcasing the modernist “globalized” urban hubs and glittering gated-
community spaces which have fronted their development planning across the SEM region, the 
reality of social space experienced by many young people is very different: large cities have 
expanded so rapidly and with such poor and underprovisioned planning that they are more 
accurately described as impoverished slums where utilities and services are often informal, 
irregular and/or non-existent. Young people find themselves “peripheralized” in university 
campuses located far from the shiny heart of the showcase cities (for example, in Egypt and 
Morocco), unable to travel freely due to the absence of safe, functioning or affordable public 
transport, denied affordable decent housing, and without any kind of safe public space for 
leisure. As Mona Harb points out, in Lebanon as elsewhere in the region, “Young people in the 
cities thus have very few freely accessible open spaces they can go to, hang out in, socialize 
and interact within” (Harb 2016: 7). Beyond the cities, young people often find themselves cut 
off from economic opportunity, living in neglected, poorly serviced and underdeveloped rural 
areas. In relation to spatial planning, a key finding of the policy analyses of Power2Youth is 
that as far as young people are considered in policy-making within any specific SEM country, 
the emphasis tends to be on “containment”, restricting them spatially to areas where they are 
invisible, where they can “do no harm” or excluding them from spaces where their presence 
is not required for business to progress. There is little or no effort made to include young 
people in decisions about urban or spatial planning, and young people’s interests do not 
feature in planning priorities. Public space has become unfriendly and unsafe for many young 
people. Even in countries where protest movements initially saw youth “recapturing” public 
spaces, the reality today is more often that old inequalities (especially between genders) have 
been reinforced, and that the contest to reclaim public space has resulted in greater violence 
and insecurity within it. Women lose out. So, for instance, young women across the region 
report facing regular physical and/or sexual harassment on public transport (where it exists) 
or in the streets. One Lebanese young woman who was part of a focus group recounted 
that it is simply not possible to get on public transport in her town without being touched 
or harassed. As will be shown later in this report, these issues take on new meanings for the 
lives of young people when placed within an analysis of their wider and multiple experiences 
of marginalization.
In summary, the impact on young people of all these areas of public policy will vary depending 
on young people’s socio-economic status, gender, educational level, religious or sectarian 
identity, place of residence and so on. What Power2Youth analyses showed, however, is 
that regardless of the impact, these policies as a whole are not youth-friendly. They do 
little to address youth-specific issues and, as will be seen below, often make matters worse. 
Young people have little or no capacity to shape public policies to specifically advance their 
interests. Instead, they and their interests are marginalized from the policy-making process. 
Resulting policies reinforce the other forms of marginalization which young people face. In 
this policy context, the idea that regime-managed “youth policies” or “youth strategies” 
can offset broader processes of marginalization in any meaningful way is unlikely to be 
convincing for young people themselves. Instead, youth policy is better understood as part 
of the marginalization process – as well as a technology for controlling and managing youth 
dissent and resistance.
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4. TALKING ABOUT SOCIAL EXCLUSION AND MARGINALIZATION
The term “social exclusion” originally referred to the processes of marginalization and 
deprivation which occur as social welfare and protection systems are dismantled or diminished 
in Europe. More recently, it has been used to describe the process in which individuals or 
groups are progressively and systematically blocked from rights, opportunities and resources, 
preventing them from being fully participant in society, “implying a break in the social bonds 
that tie the excluded individual or group to the larger society” (Paciello and Pioppi 2014: 6). 
Power2Youth found the term useful in that it expresses the relational aspect of how young 
people’s lives compare to older cohorts in the countries studied. The concept, however, is far 
from perfect and has several problems, both in terms of how it can be operationalized in data 
collection and analysis as well as its utility in thinking about policy.
Firstly, it implies that to be “included” is an ideal outcome. However, many SEM young 
people live in authoritarian and patriarchal states that contribute to inequality by privileging 
supporters and criminalizing opponents. Being “included” in this context means being 
subjected to systemic inequality. “Inclusion” can result in being disempowered rather than 
empowered. If a young person has to belong to a ruling political party in order to have access 
to resources, or if a young woman can access the labour market but is still expected to 
bear the burden of household work alone, they remain subject to embedded unequal power 
relationships. This limitation in the utility of the concept of social exclusion echoes research 
on young people from the UK which has argued that the concept of social exclusion can 
potentially mask inequalities between those who are “included” in the labour market and 
those who are restricted to low quality, low paid jobs (MacDonald and Marsh 2005). In other 
words, the concept potentially obscures more than it illuminates.
Secondly, the either/or nature of the inclusion/exclusion distinction does not adequately 
describe or help us understand the ways in which young people are marginalized, deprived of 
some of the benefits of full social participation in relation to the distribution and allocation 
of resources to maximize one’s potential for prosperity, economic and otherwise. Whereas 
exclusion tends to refer to the totality of an individual’s social existence (they are either 
excluded or included), marginalization offers a subtler way to understand the relational 
dynamics between groups. It is infinitely varied and depends on how social class, gender, area 
of residence, nationality, religious identity, tribal or family connections, party membership 
and a host of other aspects of contemporary life intersect. Logically, individuals can be 
simultaneously excluded in one domain, for example, lacking employment and economic 
security, but included within a safe, trusted family or local community where opinions can be 
voiced and listened to and individuals experience well-being. Few people in Europe or the SEM 
are absolutely excluded from, or totally included within a specific society. We all experience 
greater or lesser degrees of marginalization across the various political, economic and social 
dimensions of our lives, and those experiences of marginalization will, by definition, vary over 
time.
Thirdly, Power2Youth found that in the SEM region, the social and political forces that impel 
marginalization disproportionately affect youth, but they are not in and of themselves 
specifically “youth problems”. Rather, young people encounter these forces more consistently 
and immediately than older age groups due to a relative lack of power. This shapes young 
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people’s “front-line” exposure to forces of marginalization. Youth are often disconnected 
from both political power and more everyday means of advancing their own interests, such 
as the freedom to make social and economic choices, recognition of individual merit and 
dwelling in enabling environments. This disparity of power is observed through the multiple 
everyday marginalizations experienced by young people in SEM countries and is key to 
understanding why they might pursue other forms of action, including migration, criminality 
or violent extremism.
Fourthly, discourses of social exclusion and social inclusion have emanated from the EU 
policy context. Here, the dominant policy “solution” has been to improve the human capital 
of “the excluded” through re-integrating them into extended education and training to 
improve skills and qualifications. That, it is suggested, helps people move “from welfare to 
work”, from unemployment to labour market participation, thus signifying social inclusion. 
There are problems with this policy thinking in the European context (Levitas 1998) that are 
highlighted in sharp relief in the SEM countries. Here it is sometimes the most educated and 
qualified who face the greatest chances of unemployment. Additionally, and in relation to 
the UK policy context, the concept of “social exclusion” has within it a series of embedded 
assumptions about its causes as inhering in the individual. Hence, the policy solution becomes 
one that targets the individual, his/her deficits and his/her pathologies, rather than the social 
structural context in which young people make choices (see also Fergusson 2016).
Finally, the concept of marginalization allows us to foreground the subjective experiences 
of relative deprivation, that is the experience of being deprived of something to which one 
believes oneself to be entitled. In the SEM countries, this has a particular importance as decades 
of post-independence populist and welfarist policies fostered expectations among today’s 
young people based on how their parents’ lives were transformed by an interventionist state. 
Regimes embarked on prolonged educational enrolment, creating expectations of ever-rising 
living standards supported by high-quality employment opportunities and state-provided 
social insurance and workers’ benefits systems. However, the embrace of neo-liberal economic 
development policies in the 1980s, themselves frustrated by continuing bureaucratic and 
self-interested regime apparatuses, and the continuing weakness of regional growth rates, 
have led instead to wage depression, high unemployment rates and the rolling-back of public 
provision. Too many of today’s young people find little in the public, national and political 
discourses that resonates with their own life experiences, while their access to any form of 
formal power that might enable them to challenge those discourses is truly marginal.
Power2Youth found, then, that the concept of “multiple marginalizations” better expressed 
the status of SEM youth than did “social exclusion”. Nonetheless, the project used the 
concepts of inclusion/exclusion to recognize exclusionary power relationships, institutions 
and practices where they exist and to explore how these impacted in different ways on young 
people. Trying to work with the “either/ or” concept of social exclusion/inclusion also helped 
the researchers to see exactly how diverse young people’s experiences were (by nationality, 
gender and all the other sources of individual difference that matter in shaping the lives 
of SEM youth). Youth is not a homogeneous category, and nor can their interests simply 
be subsumed by policy makers to a biological age category. Additionally, working with the 
concept of social exclusion highlighted that the problems that young people in SEM countries 
face are not unique to that region; young people’s multiple marginalizations are not a function 
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of any presumed pathology of SEM countries. Rather, and importantly, the experiences facing 
young people in SEM countries are in many ways reminiscent of the problems of young people 
in the EU; however, they are faced in more intense and extreme forms (rates of graduate 
unemployment are one example, as we show below) and some experiences are quite different 
(such as the frightening levels of political and personal insecurity endured by SEM youth, that 
we describe shortly).
The next section of the report provides a description of what we see as being the main 
forms, modes or spheres of marginalization that were experienced across the six case study 
countries and that are most relevant to policy development.
5. THE MULTIPLE MARGINALIZATIONS OF YOUTH
In analysing the data produced as part of Power2Youth, we identified six forms, or spheres, 
of marginalization that affected young people. At the risk of repetition, the experiences of 
marginalization within each sphere and across each of the respective SEM countries will 
be variegated by a host of other forms of social differentiation. Hence, not only are there 
multiple spheres of marginalization, there are multiple experiences of specific spheres of 
marginalization. What is presented here is, therefore, necessarily more of a characterization 
of the experiences, than a detailed description of the everyday lives of young people across 
the SEM. Whilst these characterizations enabled us to think about guidelines for policy, they 
do not – nor are they intended to – reflect the full complexity or heterogeneity of experiences 
of young people across the region or within any specific country. They are perhaps more 
accurately described as heuristic devices. The six forms we identified are: insecure school-to-
work transition; unemployment and precarious living; unsafe environments, corruption and 
lack of trust in public institutions; political participation; and subjective insecurity.
5.1 Insecure School-to-Work Transitions
Young people in SEM countries do not lack education. In the last 30 years, there has been a 
large increase in school attendance (both male and female), the completion of high school, 
and university education. However, education has not yielded solutions to the exceptionally 
high rates of youth unemployment and underemployment in the region. This is despite the 
fact that, across all case study countries, individual governments have framed the problem 
of youth unemployment as an educational problem. National governments, international 
partners and organizations base their policies on the assumption that local education systems 
have poorly prepared young people for the labour market. Whilst this may be the case (see 
World Bank 2008), the relationships between education systems and labour markets are 
much more complex. Primary, secondary and tertiary educational systems are not always able 
to anticipate labour market needs and one might debate whether this should be their sole 
or even main function. Moreover, except for vocational and professional qualifying degree 
programmes, most university education is organized around disciplinary subjects rather than 
specific employment and labour market requirements.
In contrast to young people in the EU, unemployment in the SEM countries is often particularly 
marked among university graduates. For instance in Lebanon, 51 percent of those with 
completed (as opposed to those who had yet to complete) higher educational qualification 
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had had no work or employment in the preceding 12 months. In Morocco and Egypt, it was 
49 and 47 percent respectively. Seventy percent of Palestinian young people with completed 
higher educational qualifications had had no work or employment in the previous 12 months. 
Turkish university-educated young people did marginally better in that only 37 percent 
reported having had no work in the preceding 12 months.
Critics suggest that students lack critical and transferable skills, and are overly concentrated 
in the arts and humanities rather than STEM and business-friendly subjects. In general, 
schools and universities are poorly resourced and curricula heavily controlled; educational 
institutions are bureaucratic and inefficient; learning styles are dependent on rote learning 
and deference to authority; and university enrolment itself is used principally as a means 
of disguising the lack of job opportunities. Educational reform processes, often funded by 
international partners, have been stymied by political resistance of the state, bureaucratic 
inertia and vested interests. In many of the focus groups that we undertook, young people 
were very aware of the limitations of their education and of the inequalities created by better 
quality, privately funded alternative educational opportunities, and were profoundly critical 
of the governments which oversee such flawed systems.
Whatever the problems of the education and training systems of the SEM countries, we cannot 
hope to understand problems in young people’s school-to-work transitions – such as high 
rates of unemployment – without understanding both sides of the labour market: the demand 
for workers as well as their supply. Even if there are flaws in university education systems, 
the striking rates of un- and underemployment for graduates in SEM countries is evidence 
of problems in labour demand and of deep, structural flaws in national economies. There 
are simply insufficient good quality jobs to go around. In practice, this means that, in this 
context of the over-supply of graduates to an already saturated labour market, attempts to 
increase the level or quality of individuals’ education achievement can result, paradoxically, in 
intensified competition for scarce employment opportunities and, consequently, an increase 
in individuals’ subjective experiences of marginalization.
5.2 Unemployment and Precarious Living
A second aspect of the marginalization faced by young people related to issues of 
unemployment and precarious living. The region, in common with parts of Europe, suffers 
from high rates of unemployment and underemployment (that is, people working in jobs 
for which they are overqualified and people wanting more hours of work than they can 
find). Labour markets are increasingly characterized by precarious forms of employment 
and a reliance on the informal economy. In SEM countries and elsewhere, young people are 
exceptionally vulnerable to these economic trends because they are the most recent entrants 
to the labour market. Young people’s economic precarity is made worse within the SEM, 
however, because neo-liberal economic policies are enacted alongside regionally specific and 
enduring patrimonial modes of behaviour. So, for instance, of those who took part in the 
surveys in the case study countries, between half and three-quarters had had no work or 
employment in the preceding 12 months.
Neo-liberal economic policies, endorsed by international partners and organizations, are 
transforming national economies from statist models which assume a leading role for the 
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public sector in production, employment, exchange and trade, towards a model in which it 
is presumed that the private sector will assume primary responsibility for these activities. 
Against this ideal, the reality is that the private sector in SEM countries remains weak and 
unable to compete effectively in international markets, and in some cases – such as Egypt 
– because of its capture by various state extensions. As part of the shift away from statist 
economic models, public sector employment opportunities have been frozen or reduced 
and subsequently competition for the limited jobs available in the private sector is fierce. 
Such competition benefits older, more experienced applicants or those young people who 
already enjoy relative advantages (better education, bilingualism, proximity to urban hubs, 
international connections, etc.), all of which exacerbates the extant inequalities between and 
among young people and adults.
In keeping with neo-liberal economic ideology and since the 1970s many governments across 
the EU as well as other Franco- and Anglophone countries have supported the private sector 
by reducing the regulatory burdens associated with labour protections. SEM countries have 
been encouraged via international and partner organizations to do the same. What this 
means in practice is that those older workers already in employment in SEM countries retire 
later and hold on fiercely to their employment-related privileges while young new entrants 
have no bargaining power relative to employers, must wait longer for posts to become 
available and suffer qualification inflation as competition for jobs increases. Compared to 
older cohorts in the SEM, young people enjoy lower wages, less or no job security, and fewer 
work-related benefits. These are aspects of intergenerational inequality that have similarly 
been remarked upon in respect of younger and older generations in Europe (Roberts 2012). In 
SEM countries, young adults also now have fewer alternative public sector opportunities than 
previously. Informal employment, often supplementing underemployment, is increasingly the 
norm for young people, as is the phenomenon of “churning” between formal and informal 
employment. Similar trends are noticed in EU countries (see MacDonald 2017). While SEM 
and EU young people may be enduring similar processes, SEM young people’s experiences 
in this regard are intensified by the fact that their access to any employment (precarious or 
otherwise) is often also dependent on wasta (that is, personal connections) or formal political 
affiliation. Crucially, the Power2Youth survey revealed that young people perceive wasta to 
be by far the single most important factor in accessing employment, with over 90 percent 
of survey respondents in every country surveyed believing it to be either “very” or “fairly 
important”. In this environment, there is little faith in either education or formal government-
run employment programmes as secure routes into employment.
Meanwhile, the relative deprivation – or disconnect between aspirations fostered by longer 
periods in education and qualification inflation on the one hand, and the strictly limited 
opportunities for work, income, savings and future security on the other – experienced 
by young people in the SEM countries intensifies and becomes more widespread. Of the 
employed young people surveyed by Power2Youth, only between 17 percent (Palestine) and 
40 percent (Lebanon) had a formal contract for their employment, and between 53 percent 
(Morocco and Lebanon) and 72 percent (Egypt) were “very” or “somewhat afraid” of losing 
their job: these are clear indications that even when people are in standard employment this 
is often very precarious.
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Attempts by national governments to create employment opportunities for SEM young people 
have reproduced policy interventions imported from international financial organizations 
and partners (including the EU). These often seek to fix both youth unemployment and 
the precarious of nature of employment through individualizing strategies that encourage 
“entrepreneurialism”, offer vocational training programmes and active labour market 
programmes and are often based on the belief that unemployment and precarity are the 
result of young people’s deficient skills, approach, attitude or education. The data collected 
for Power2Youth demonstrated that young people often accept these prescriptions (which, 
of course, does not mean they are accurate) but at the same time are highly sceptical that 
the limited opportunities will be equally available to all young people. Whilst there are broad 
similarities in the interventions designed to deal with unemployment and precarious living 
between EU and SEM countries, a problem for the latter is that in promoting entrepreneurialism, 
these programmes can reproduce existing inequalities by privileging those young people who 
possess personal connections, political party membership, elite educations and bilingualism. 
These problems are recognized by SEM young people and they are aware that programmes do 
little to counter the structural weaknesses of local economies, cannot produce employment 
opportunities in sufficient quantity, and often result in subsidizing already corrupt and 
inefficient employers. For these reasons, and as was demonstrated time and again in our 
focus groups, they are eager for international partners to be more robust in their monitoring 
of externally funded programmes and to impose conditions which promote equality of access. 
Those who took part in the focus groups endorsed more even distribution of the benefits of 
programmes to include poorer, rural and previously neglected regions.
A significant difference in the experiences of marginalization in relation to unemployment 
and precarious living between SEM and EU young people is that, for young people in the SEM 
countries, there is no equivalent of job-seekers’ allowances or income support payments. 
Even if they find work, they are highly unlikely to receive the social insurance, pension and 
other work-related benefits that their parents enjoyed. They understand their economic 
future as insecure at best. They are more likely to experience material dependence on family 
– or indeed poverty – for longer, and if they are ill or disabled, they can rarely afford anything 
but the most basic medical treatment. Food subsidies and anti-poverty interventions are 
increasingly targeted towards the very poorest, resulting in a large precarious middle class 
which can slip into poverty at any moment and which is increasingly mired in private debt.
5.3 Unsafe Environments
The third sphere of marginalization – noted across all the country reports and data collected 
as part of the Power2Youth project – was that created through unsafe environments. The 
research demonstrated that problems of unsafe environment are particularly acute for young 
people in rapidly expanding but poorly serviced urban areas and in the largely neglected 
rural communities which lack public investment, transport and communications connections, 
or appropriate public educational and health provision.4 Interview and focus group data 
demonstrated that young people, who lack employment and independent incomes, expressed 
the view that there is little hope for a future in rural areas, and young men (but increasingly 
young women too) feel impelled to migrate to the cities or abroad, despite the accompanying 
4 Please see Power2Youth publications: http://www.power2youth.eu/publications.
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dangers. Because of existing gender-based ideologies, young women are more likely to be 
obliged into marriage as a means of reducing the burden they place on the family home. 
Noticeable in greater or lesser extents across all surveyed countries, increased internal 
migration has led to rapid urbanization, the process of which has been subject to embedded 
corruption and poor planning. The results have been the growth of frequently dangerous 
banlieues, offering insufficient appropriate and affordable housing, inadequate public 
transport and very limited and often unsafe pedestrian spaces. It was regularly reported 
that municipal services like waste collection were limited and of low quality, as was the poor 
provision of utilities such as water and electricity. In this environment, young people talked 
about the difficulty of finding safe youth-friendly spaces to engage in social and leisure 
activities, or to simply move around safely, affordably and without anxiety. For some young 
people, urban spaces felt like little more than prisons, daily physical manifestations of their 
own restricted opportunities. They reported an irony: even as the Internet and satellite TV 
tell them more about the world beyond their immediate context, the worlds in which they 
live their day-to-day lives are becoming smaller. For young women this was particularly acute 
with physical safety in public spaces now an urgent issue. As one young woman from Tunis 
explained: “We have to always think about where we go, what time we go and with who we 
go. We cannot go freely”. Few young people felt safe even in youth-oriented spaces such as 
university campuses.
Many young people in SEM countries feel that that national police and security forces offer 
them little or no protection but actively conspire to exacerbate their physical insecurity. Not 
surprisingly then, the Power2Youth survey found that between 55 percent (Morocco) and 73 
percent (Palestine) of young people spent most of their free time in the family home. One 
young Lebanese woman participant stated that she and her friends would only go out in 
groups of four or more, and described the lengthy psychological preparations they engaged 
in to deal with the perceived and actual insecurity and lack of safety that confronts them 
in public places. These feelings were echoed by a young woman from Nablus City who, in 
addition to noting issues of neighbourhood, said: “My neighbours make me feel secure. The 
Israeli soldiers come to the home and we do not feel safe. Girls on the street also do not 
always feel safe in the street, I mean at night because of harassment. Girls cannot go freely 
anywhere at night”.
For young Palestinians, and because of the Israeli occupation, the problem of physical safety 
is particularly acute: “Indeed, feeling unsafe, afraid and threatened is very much part of daily 
life, more so in the Gaza Strip than in the West Bank, but relevant to both” (Giacaman et al. 
2017: 27). Palestinian security institutions are unable to defend the physical safety of the 
population and have been effectively co-opted into the structures which deny it to them, 
creating an intensified form of layered insecurity.
5.4 Corruption and Lack of Trust
A fourth sphere of marginalization is that associated with corruption and the lack of trust 
in public institutions. In common with other spheres of marginalization, the intensity and 
effects depend on other forms of social differentiation. Corruption is endemic across the 
SEM countries. Its impact is immeasurable. The survey data demonstrated – and the focus 
groups corroborated – that young people are profoundly conscious that any progression and 
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advancement for them (e.g., in employment, education or access to services) is dependent 
on wasta. They resent it as generally bad for social and economic life, but also use it when 
necessary to improve their own lives. As a young woman from Nablus City explained in a focus 
group, “I feel pessimistic about jobs. I graduated. Everyone needs an intermediary, for every 
opportunity, for work, you need wasta in these times. No wasta, no work. Even for training”. 
One of the young men from a Beirut focus group put it even more succinctly: “Without wasta, 
it would not make it better [because of the lack of infrastructure], it would make it fairer”.
However, relying on wasta means that young people are even more subordinated to older 
people who are already in positions of power. The systemic corruption in SEM states leaves 
young people vulnerable, forcing them to engage in unfair competition for jobs or access 
to opportunities and representation and marginalizing them as less powerful, even when 
they do have access to personal connections. These views were regularly corroborated in 
the focus group interviews. For instance, one young man from Beirut explained: “We need 
to change the system and the culture because we are doing everything to make ourselves 
better, but inefficiencies and corruption don’t change”.
Figure 4 | Percentage of respondents who felt confidence in public institutions
Note: Egyptian data is missing for this question.
Source: Power2Youth, Aggregated National Survey Data.
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One of the key and crucial differences between the types of marginalizing experiences endured 
by the young people in the EU and SEM young people, is that for the latter the state’s role as an 
arbiter of fair and equal practices is missing. This, even though most SEM countries have legal 
institutions defending individuals from arbitrary practices and discrimination based on age 
(see Figure 4). In their daily lives and to varying degrees, many SEM young people experience 
the absence of the rule of law, and the inability or unwillingness of public judicial or other 
bodies to enforce relevant regulations. Political and legal institutions are often themselves 
riddled with patrimonial modes of behaviour at best, and outright corruption at worst, and 
young people have little or no trust in them, leading to low political participation rates and 
a high degree of political abstinence. Formal state institutions are seen as belonging to, and 
privileging, older generations, undermining notions of citizenship and national “belonging”. 
In this environment, it is hardly surprising that many SEM young people see those closest to 
them – their family – as being the most trustworthy.
5.5 Political (Non)participation
A fifth sphere in which the marginalizing experiences of young people in SEM countries are 
shaped is that associated with political participation. What this means in practice will vary 
across countries and across the social differences of young people within any particular 
country. The Power2Youth project demonstrates the links between the coercive behaviour 
of authoritarian states and young people’s awareness of their everyday vulnerability to 
arbitrary state violence (i.e., imprisonment, beatings, and in some states, rape and torture). It 
is this aspect of young people’s lives in SEM countries which is perhaps most specific to the 
region and different from that of many Europeans: the absence of expectations of personal or 
physical security and the role of the state and its security institutions in reproducing, rather 
than protecting them from this. Young people are constantly aware of implicit and explicit 
“red lines”, which if crossed, can result in violence even in everyday settings. Examples 
include: young women, who are particularly vulnerable to sexual violence; Palestinian youth 
travelling to university, having to face armed soldiers at an Israeli check-point; or Egyptian 
bloggers arrested and tortured in prison. The “Arab Spring” protests have so far led to 
renewed authoritarianism (Egypt and Turkey), civil war (Libya and Syria) and at best, a still 
extraordinarily fragile transition (Tunisia). In these conditions of physical uncertainty, young 
people often doubt promises of an improved future or a political role for themselves therein.
Despite this, many young people in the SEM region are politically active, although the 
evidence suggests that their preference is for informal and alternative modes of activism 
and participation rather than participation through conventional political institutions such as 
parties or government-run youth initiatives. They engage in protests, single-issue campaigning, 
cultural politics, social entrepreneurship and social media activism, preferring youth-friendly 
spaces and behaviours. Conventional political spaces are often avoided, either because older 
cohorts dominate institutions and make little space for young people, or because they are 
considered corrupt and co-opted by authoritarian regimes with no legitimacy in the eyes of 
young people. As two young Tunisians put it:
I can’t be a member in a political party, I can’t be a prisoner to a rigid hierarchy waiting 
for a leader’s orders to participate in a mobilization and waiting for their orders to 
take a decision or an attitude concerning such and such an event happening in the 
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country. I want to be free. […] We don’t need anyone to help us circulate our demands, 
we are able to do it without any mediators. (Hamdi 2017)
Referring to political parties as being mainly concerned with their own image rather than 
effectively representing the interests of members or contributing to the national good, one 
Palestinian member of a focus group said: “There are no political parties except during their 
festivals/ commemorations” (Giacaman et al. 2017: 21).
Power2Youth survey data shows that young people are twice as likely to participate in group 
activities designed to address specific problems as they are to become members of formal 
organizations, showing a preference for issue-based activism which does not require formal 
membership or adherence to an organization. By abstaining or being excluded from formal 
political spaces, young people are usually unable to make substantive changes. Being excluded 
from the corridors of power increases their marginalization, although the evidence suggests 
that this is more likely to be the case in national political institutions than in regional or 
local government institutions. Many young people find that local political spaces are more 
open, receptive to youth-led initiatives and generally “safer” than national political spaces. 
For example, in the focus groups in Palestine “some participants noted having had positive 
experiences with their local municipalities and governorates, and having generally found them 
to be receptive to and interested in the needs of youth volunteers” (Giacaman et al. 2017: 22). 
In Lebanon too, some local mayors have involved youth in decision-making regarding spatial 
planning (Harb 2016: 4). Being themselves often neglected by national governments, and 
often relatively autonomous from them, local authorities are then often more receptive to 
and dependent on citizen-led initiatives, including those of young people.
Notably, in Palestine young people continued to be particularly active in their protests against 
Israeli occupation and in sustaining the “Third Uprising”, insisting in acting independently of 
political institutions.
5.6 Subjective Insecurities
The sixth and final form of marginalization experienced to a greater or lesser extent by the 
SEM young people we surveyed was associated with the subjective insecurities that can result 
from blocked or delayed transition to the social status of adulthood. Financial independence, 
personal autonomy, marriage and parenthood are all taking place later for SEM young people 
than for their parents’ generation – something that is shared between SEM and EU young 
people (MacDonald 2011). The young people surveyed by Power2Youth frequently expressed 
their frustration at their prolonged dependence on, and residence with, family. One of the key 
differences with some of the northern European countries, however, is that this prolonged 
dependence takes place in a patriarchal context where seniority brings privileges and young 
people, especially young women, are expected to defer to their seniors. It is worth noting 
that of those surveyed, between 66.8 percent (Palestine) and 85.2 percent (Tunisia) of young 
people still lived in the maternal home. As one of the young men in a focus group in Beirut 
said: “Even if you wanted to be independent, you can’t because rent costs too much and the 
housing is all for families”. It is worth noting that this particular respondent was in his late 
twenties.
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Young people’s delayed attainment of the social status of “adult” is not matched by a delay in 
physical maturity. The issues that arise from this are complex and profound when celibacy is 
an issue of (family) honour. As Power2Youth data demonstrated, young SEM people frequently 
find their pursuit of a social life beyond the family controversial and their thoughts and 
opinions unvalued. The survey data revealed that only 29 percent (Tunisia) and 50 percent 
(Lebanon) of young people felt their opinions were taken seriously by their families, with a 
significantly lower percentage of young women feeling this compared to young men (e.g., 
in Egypt 51 percent of young men felt their opinions were taken seriously compared to just 
24 percent of young women). As their transitions are extended well into the age of physical 
and emotional maturity, and as they develop cultural, political and sexual identities of their 
own, they become increasingly frustrated and experience deep social marginalization in both 
public and private spheres.
Having been exposed to more education than their forebears and enjoying new forms of 
global popular youth culture and communications, young people often have a split sense of 
social self – one relevant to being in the family and one belonging to the social world outside 
their family – thus switching from youth to adult in a constant process of navigation between 
multiple identities. The narratives of nation and citizen propounded by the state have little 
resonance for them as they are vulnerable to its arbitrary actions and its withdrawal from 
economic and social provision. Meanwhile, the norms and cultures of conservative patriarchal 
society which offer some degree of material shelter are at odds with their evolving and 
globally connected identities and their need to move beyond the confines of the family. Thus, 
young people suffer from a subjective insecurity, a sense of not belonging, and of being 
separate from the rules and structures within which they live their everyday lives.
The process can be particularly complex for young women, with established norms of social 
control over their bodies being in sharp contrast to their need for opportunities to express 
their adult identities. Research across the SEM region indicates that young women continue 
to suffer more consistently and to a greater degree across all the areas of marginalization 
mentioned above. Despite national commitments to international conventions protecting 
women and promoting their equality, the reality for young women is that – despite being 
more likely to achieve a higher level of education than their mothers – they continue to be 
under-represented in the labour force, to be subordinated to patriarchal norms and practices 
in both home and the public sphere, to be vulnerable to emotional and physical abuse, to face 
sexual harassment in employment or public social spaces, to be poor and to lack financial 
and bodily security. One of the focus group interviewees in Beirut summed up this dynamic 
when she stated: “I would like to have a job and be independent but the truth is my family will 
pressure me to get married and have children. Then I will pressure my children and everything 
will begin all over again”. The irony is that this respondent was approaching completion of 
her degree at a prestigious university and was reflecting on what was likely to happen when 
she completed her education.
Marginalization affects people of all ages, and intersects with class, race, ethnicity, religion 
and other forms of social differentiation and inequality. However, and regardless of important 
differences between young people, youth as a social group suffer more acutely than do older 
cohorts in part because their lack of (access to) power in either public or domestic spaces 
means they can do little to counter the uncertainties, insecurities and multiple forms of 
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marginalization that they face.
6. GUIDELINES FOR YOUTH-RELEVANT POLICY
The preceding sections of this report provide the context for thinking about what type 
of policies and interventions might help address the complex, variegated and multiple 
marginalizations that SEM young people experience. As has been demonstrated, aspects of 
these experiences are shared between SEM and EU young people. Where they are shared, SEM 
young people often experience them in ways that are more intense by order of magnitude. 
Thus, for instance, some EU and young people experience insecurity and lack of safety in 
public places and recognize that the policing of those spaces is not always about securing 
their safety, but rather securing the space against the perceived threat they pose. This is 
particularly the case in large urban centres and in relation to young ethnic minority men.5 
Indeed, it is the recognition that security can and does mean very different things for the 
excluded and marginalized that underlies the US Black Lives Matter campaign which has 
sought to highlight the disproportionate, punitive and occasionally fatal policing of black 
communities (see http://blacklivesmatter.com/). The insecurity faced by some SEM young 
people is different from that faced by their European peers – and can include threats to their 
existential safety and security. This is particularly the case in those countries that are in 
conflict or are moving away from conflict (see particularly Occupied Palestine Territory or 
Lebanon). As one young Lebanese man said: “You don’t know if a bomb will explode in the 
road and kill you”.
Many of the experiences of marginalization described above are not shared with EU young 
people, and not equally shared across the SEM region. Whatever the case, the evidence 
collected by Power2Youth indicates that young people in the SEM countries face profound and 
multiple marginalizations in their political, economic and social lives which are produced and 
reproduced through both formal and informal institutions. This marginalization is not simply 
or just a result of being young (although this applies in some contexts) but rather occurs 
because the causes of marginalization are most concentrated in the physical, social, economic 
and political spaces which young people fill, making them most vulnerable. It is possible to 
draw two very clear policy implications from the evidence produced by Power2Youth.
The first key conclusion is that policy-makers need to recognise that “youth problems” in 
SEM countries are, in fact, problems that affect the wider population as well but which hit 
young people particularly hard – and that these result from the profound structural, political 
and economic weaknesses of SEM states. Youth-targeted policy interventions cannot have a 
meaningful impact for most young people unless larger problems are addressed first (these 
are problems associated with authoritarian and patriarchal states, corruption and absence 
of the rule of law, and reliance on a weak, under-performing private sector for job creation).
The second key conclusion is that young people experience these marginalizing forces 
differently, depending on their nationality, class, religion or sect, gender, place of residence 
or other identifying characteristics. Youth is not a homogeneous category and what improves 
5 For an introductory exploration of policing and race and ethnicities, see Phillips and Bowling 2012.
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life for one young person will not necessarily be relevant to another. Interventions that might 
benefit some young people (e.g., women, people from deprived backgrounds) might work 
against the interests of other young people (e.g., men, more privileged young people). There 
is therefore no policy panacea that will address all the multiple forms of marginalization 
that affect young people, and policy interventions that specifically and only target youth are 
unlikely to resolve the underlying political and economic issues that cause these experiences 
of marginalization.
The research conducted by Power2Youth has indicated that the best approach might be to 
articulate a number of principles for policy interventions which seek to ameliorate some 
of the difficulties faced by SEM young people. These are outlined below and are based on 
the evidence that young people in the countries studied are, despite everything, active and 
willing to be engaged. They are able to navigate their difficult surroundings to make the best 
of what they have – indeed their adaptive capabilities have become a necessity of everyday 
life. One of their biggest frustrations is their inability to positively change the world around 
them. Therefore, it is vital that policy-makers, either nationally or from external partners 
and organizations, do not reinforce the systems of control that suppress young people’s 
ability to positively affect their environment. As a result, policy-makers are encouraged to 
start with the basic principle of do no harm: that is, assess the risk that interventions will 
actually work against young people’s interests and do not enact policies to address one field 
of action which have secondary, negative impacts in another. The guidelines that follow are 
intended to provide a framework within which it is possible to imagine and create policy 
interventions in specific contexts that will ensure that, whatever else may be the case, those 
specific interventions will not harm or further erode SEM young people’s social conditions of 
existence. Thus, the guidelines articulate a set of principles rather than any formulaic or “off-
the-shelf” solution to the complex issues described in this report. Specifically:
• Policies should not reinforce the narratives of “Youth as Hope of the Nation” vs. “Youth 
as Threat” or see youth as somehow set apart from the rest of society – or assume a 
homogeneity to the category “youth” that does not exist. In practice this means not creating, 
or encouraging, “youth policies” which are isolated from broader strategies to address 
structural inequalities and injustices. External actors, in particular, might usefully review how 
their own “narratives of youth” support or impede this objective, or where their interventions 
inadvertently endorse and reproduce such narratives.
• It is essential that policy-making recognizes the diversity of interests and experiences among 
young people, as well as their differential capacities to progress to full adulthood dependent 
on a range of factors such as class, ethnicity, gender, religion or sect, etc.
• Identifying the most vulnerable and most marginalized in any given context, as well as the root 
and case-specific causes of that marginalization, is important. Too often, policy misdiagnoses 
the problem or addresses only the symptoms (e.g., “active labour market programmes” that 
aim to move unemployed or NEET young people into jobs) without addressing the causes 
(the structural lack of demand for young workers). For example, policies that lead to the 
recurrent oversupply of graduates to an already saturated labour market are likely to amplify 
rather than solve social and economic problems. So, without a broader context of economic 
reform, such interventions become mere sticking-plasters and can actually disguise the 
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more problematic aspects of national economic policies. Similarly, lowering the voting age 
or introducing youth quotas in political institutions cannot resolve the problem of low youth 
participation if young people feel excluded by gerontocratic informal political practices, and 
unsafe when they challenge the prevailing political discourses.
Young people in our focus groups actively requested that we highlight the following: that 
when external actors work with SEM states, it is crucial to create and support systems 
for strong monitoring and evaluation of funded projects, programmes and interventions, 
where possible making EU support conditional upon demonstrably increasing transparency, 
accountability and fairness in delivery, so that confidence can be built in state institutions and 
in the application of the rule of law. Self-conscious and consistent review of accountability 
mechanisms in policy interventions would help avoid inadvertent endorsement of corrupt 
practices or exclusionary regime practices. A young man from one of the focus groups in 
Lebanon put it like this: “The EU should stop funding programmes and projects that further 
legitimize corrupt systems and should focus on rebuilding trust in public institutions and 
public transport”. Of course, detailed financial and other reporting is usually already 
required, but youth populations know little of these mechanisms and have little confidence 
in the institutions which receive and distribute programme support. It is worth considering 
whether resources can usefully be spent as part of each intervention to try to improve public 
awareness of existing monitoring and accountability mechanisms.
• There is merit in the idea of establishing a guiding principle for all interventions of fair and 
equal access for all potential beneficiaries of youth-targeted, capacity-building programmes 
and that these should reach into rural areas, poorer urban areas, and monolingual 
communities.6 Here we are distinguishing between corruption through illegal diversion of 
funds (which can be averted through the detailed accounting processes already often in 
place) and more subtle forms of patronage and wasta which are unlikely to be made visible 
through paper-trails of financial accounting but which can equally undermine confidence 
and engagement in youth-targeted interventions. Increasing and spreading opportunities 
equally to all would require interventions that reduce intra-urban and urban/rural divides, 
for example by supporting efficient, safe public transport, supporting the provision of 
affordable public housing, and public utility provision. In this way, policy interventions which 
reproduce inequality and exclusion such as the urban/rural divide (i.e., by only being available 
in relatively safe, familiar capital cities), language divides (effectively requiring applicants to 
speak a European language, for example) and gender divides (e.g., requiring participants to 
travel to and from events at night) might be avoided.
• Policy interventions in other areas (e.g., counter-radicalization or management of informal 
migration) should not be allowed to reduce meaningful and legitimate opportunities for young 
people such as travel exchanges and educational opportunities in Europe and elsewhere. 
Here, it is helpful to refer back to the earlier point regarding not endorsing “youth as problem” 
narratives which homogenize all young people into being either potential informal migrants 
or violent Islamists.
6 In this context projects such as Young Arab Voices (http://www.youngarabvoices.org) may serve as a model.
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• It is important to cultivate genuinely enabling environments, local and national, in which 
SEM young people can safely participate in the political life of their country and have an 
impact on their own future. Policies should be avoided which assume that political stability 
is necessarily good for young people – all too often supporting current configurations of 
political stability means supporting the marginalization and disenfranchisement of young 
people. Policies should avoid endorsing authoritarian means of securing stability or 
countering radicalization which simultaneously act to exclude and repress all young people. 
It is important to support interventions which give young people a meaningful role in formal 
institutions rather than endorsing youth-specific institutions which have no impact on formal 
decision-making. Supporting and enabling meaningful youth participation in formal “adult” 
political institutions is likely to be more useful than sponsoring parallel but ineffective “youth” 
institutions. It is worth remembering that the rather fashionable objective of giving young 
people a “voice” is not helpful if no-one is interested in listening, and if one young person’s 
voice is not reflective of all. Supporting existing institutions in learning to listen to, and to 
be inclusive of, young people may be more productive. It is also important to recognize that 
young people need secure, safe access to public spaces where they (especially women) can 
engage in civic discourse.
• Youth-targeted interventions work best when they enable young people to define for 
themselves how to develop their social capital. Top-down, government-led initiatives and 
interventions are often beset by the problems of corruption, cronyism, political capture and 
lack of trust that constitute much of the marginalization that young people face. Young people 
often have a proven capacity to adapt, but – like adults – they also typically want to have more 
say about their own future. Interventions which enable them to do this are the most likely to 
gain their trust and engagement and to have sustainable outcomes. Power2Youth research 
showed that projects initiated at the local, often municipal level, and in which young people 
were actively engaged in the design and implementation stages, were most likely to result in 
positive outcomes. External policy makers may legitimately be concerned that sub-national 
actors are unlikely to have the technical or financial capacity to manage funded projects 
and interventions, in which case technical partnerships with third parties who can offer that 
capacity might be desirable and part of the trade-off needed to secure the effectiveness of 
interventions, or at least the confidence of young people in the integrity of the institutions/
organizations involved. Securing this confidence, which is needed both for youth engagement 
but also to improve the perceived environment which young people inhabit, may be viewed as 
a crucial determining factor for successful policy-making in itself.
• Policy interventions should recognize the fundamental role played by personal and physical 
insecurity in inhibiting young people’s engagement, activism and participation in social, 
economic, cultural and political life. Interventions that provide safe physical or virtual spaces 
and means of access, in which young people can meet, deliberate, network and exchange 
knowledge and skills are invaluable. Such spaces enable young people to experience a feeling 
of inclusion and of personal empowerment, unimpeded by relative age-defined status. 
Similarly, interventions which challenge the normative acceptance of violence in everyday 
life and promote the possibilities for young people, especially young women, to be safe, active 
citizens are crucially important. Defence of human rights, the appropriate training of security 
and police forces, and support for civil society organizations working in these fields should 
remain high on the agenda of international partners.
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7. SEM YOUNG PEOPLE AND THE FUTURE
The future for the young people of the SEM countries is very uncertain and insecure. Indeed, 
insecurity – physical, political, economic and social – was the dominant motif that emerged 
from the research across these countries. One young woman in Beirut put it succinctly: “We 
think about our futures all the time. We cannot waste time by having fun. For everything we 
do, there is an opportunity cost”.
Yet despite this, it was also clear that not all young people are pessimistic about their future 
and that many of them are willing and able to participate in finding solutions to the political, 
economic and social difficulties that beset them and their countries. The challenge for policy-
makers is to capture the energy, skills, imagination and enthusiasm of young people and to do 
so in a manner which allows them to shape their own futures. Policy-making which excludes 
the preferences and visions of young people themselves, or which imposes preconceived 
wisdoms upon young people through corrupt, failing and exclusionary institutions, will only 
marginalize young people – and their potential contribution – still further.
Perhaps the key challenge for policy makers is to rethink, through dialogue with young people, 
the relative roles of the State and the market. Young people have inherited expectations of 
the State which current neo-liberal prescriptions cannot fulfil. Moreover, authoritarian models 
of government, which are perhaps inadvertently supported by international partners in the 
shared “war on terror”, cannot incorporate the aspirations and demands of young people for 
more and a better quality of political and civil freedom. As long as policy is made through – or 
subject to – the preferences of existing State models, it cannot be inclusive of the interests, 
aspirations and identities of young people.
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